It is common in discussions at Bowdoin and in progressive circles to denounce the Republican response to the refugee crisis. And the outrage is no doubt warranted after Donald Trump described a mere 10,000 Syrian refugees as a potential ISIS “Trojan Horse,” Ben Carson compared them to rabid dogs and 30 GOP governors refused their entry under highly questionable claims of “security.”

But ultimately (and thankfully), people like Trump, Carson and Maine Governor Paul LePage have not been conducting our foreign policy since 2008. Far fewer progressives, with the notable exception of Hillary Clinton, are willing to ask the harder question: what do we make of Obama’s decision-making so far through the Syrian civil war, which cost Syria more than 250,000 lives and displaced half its citizens? Bear with me as I admittedly embark on some armchair foreign policymaking and Monday Morning diplomacy.

From the outbreak of the Syrian civil war in 2011, Bashar al-Assad showed his true colors as the “Butcher of Damascus,” in a government reign of terror through sieges by starvation, barrel bombings, torture and chemical weapons. The Syrian Network for Human Rights reported that Assad’s government forces were responsible for seven times more civilian deaths in Syria than ISIS so far in 2015.

Throughout this time, Obama ignored calls for more decisive action against Assad, not from the world’s Cheneys and Rumsfelds, but from his own foreign policy team. He turned down calls from his then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, CIA Director General David Petraeus and Defense Secretary Leon Panetta for a more interventionist approach through empowering moderate Sunni rebel groups and creating no-fly zones. This was all the more tragic, since, in 2011 and 2012, groups like the Free Syrian Army were driving opposition to the regime in comparison to al-Qaeda and ISIS. Obama’s insulation from critical administration voices continues to this day. A Politico September investigation found a “demoralized Obama national security team” in the aftermath of Putin’s escalation in Syria. Obama’s inaction even drove the U.S. Ambassador to Syria Robert S. Ford in February 2014 to resign.

I admittedly take Obama’s cautious realism over much of George W. Bush’s first-term neoconservatism most days. A third major American war in the mold of Afghanistan or Iraq would be wrong and receive no backing from an exhausted public. Nevertheless, Obama was mistaken in neglecting a harder move against Assad beyond meaningless “red lines” and bland statements that “Assad must go” or, even more banal, that he is “on the wrong side of history.” A more confident, stronger Syrian opposition would have held a greater voice at the negotiating table for a postwar settlement that might have removed Assad without totally excluding Alawite, Shiite and Iranian interests in Syria. It could have created pockets of safety and order as the foundations of a new state. Most of all, Sunnis might not have found extremist groups like al-Nursa Front and the ISIS, given their resources and military skill, to be their last resort of defense.

The latter danger actually came to fruition in Syria as David Ignatius described in a perceptive Atlantic critique of both Bush and Obama’s Middle Eastern policy. As Sunni communities found themselves at the mercy of Assad with little Western assistance, it is no surprise that extremist jihadist groups became more attractive. And the prospect of a dual conflict of ISIS and Assad is playing into the dictator’s hands, allowing him to partially rehabilitate his image in the West as the last hope of stability against ISIS.

Today, the world faces the greatest refugee crisis since World War II. The European Union confronts a humanitarian challenge that could test its very survival; one need only see an explosion of far-right populism stretching from Sweden to France. Syria’s historic religious pluralism and ancient Christian communities unravel. Hope for a lasting peace, or perhaps just a decent one along the lines of Lebanon or Bosnia, looks ever bleaker.

It would be absurd to cast blame on Obama for this extremely complex crisis, but Obama’s foreign policy requires some serious reconsideration in the light of these horrors. Peter Beinart wrote that historians will record Obama’s work on the Syrian refugee crisis “among his finest hours.” On that question, Beinart is right. On the deeper issue of the Syrian civil war, short of Providence’s unexpected surprises, Obama’s legacy is hardly so clear.